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Abstract
Economics is a social science, so is economic design as a field. This short article
discusses, in particular, the future of economic design, and of economic theory in
general. By suggesting some examples, I hope to convince the readers that the recent
technological advances in science and technology will not only be disruptive to the
social machinery that surrounds us but also to the future of economic design as a field.
However, economic design, as an established field, has the potential to add value to
the society by offering an axiomatic framework to the design of the future with a social
sciences perspective.
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Introduction
Economics as a scientific discipline is a study within the domain of social sciences. Therefore
economic theory is about building theoretical foundations for social phenomena that we
experience around us. Economic design as a theoretical subdiscipline is about analyzing,
designing, implementing, or improving markets, systems, institutions, -broadly speaking
any socio-economic, legal, financial platform- under which agents interact and engage in
transactions that are financial or otherwise.
The rules of engagement in economic systems are based on our assumptions about
agents, their payoff functions, and social norms that define what is desirable in a system.
We consider agents to be utility maximizers and hence the more the cargo, the merrier. We
assume that agents will be in a pursuit of happiness, whatever that concept might mean.
This implies that agents would (if they could) try to manipulate and game the system1. We
deal with cases involving uncertainty, risk, asymmetric information. We also worry about
efficiency, and fairness in the design of our systems, along with other desirable norms in
our society. We define mathematical axioms that relate to or reflect those noble notions.
The design of our systems are often axiomatic quests for finding mechanisms with
normatively appealing features proposed by the economic designer, such as finding efficient,
non-manipulable, fair mechanisms for a given problem with certain assumptions on agents’
(humans’) behavior and level of information which is available to the agents. The future
of economic design, however, is not necessarily in the design of these systems under which
humans interact. It is in the design of systems for phenomena that are not necessarily
within the scope of social sciences. For instance:
1. The design of mechanisms under which internet of things (IoT), artificial intelligence
(AI), and robots interact on platforms featuring properties desirable to these things.
The design of collective decision mechanisms that can handle Big Data produced by
these machines and that has Big Data as its main concern, e.g., computational com-
plexity, aggregation via delegation, aggregation on networks, clustering algorithms
etc.
2. The design of digital transaction/interaction methods with advances in digital tech-
nologies in mind, e.g., Blockchain, Ethereum and other distributed ledger technologies
(DLT) and cryptocurrencies. The design of digital platform economies, under which
assumptions on information structure is different than traditional systems, and agents
are on a typically multi-sided network, e.g., Uber, AirBnB, App Store, Social Media.
1There is an undeniably growing literature on behavioral economics where the rationality assumption
is seriously challenged, and there are other proposed concepts such as bounded rationality, altruism, reci-
procity, k-level reasoning etc., which are beyond the scope of this article.
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These disruptive technologies will eventually lead to drastic changes in the society, and
the economy, hence also in the way we design the latter. In what follows, I discuss the
possible effects of these innovations on the study of economic design with some examples.
1 Disruptive technologies and their design
1.1 Untraditional agents: IoT, AI, Big Data & Robots
IoT broadly refers to devices that connect to the internet or a network, deliver data, take
actions and typically comprise of MCUs (micro controller units), sensors and actuators.
These devices might also incorporate AI and can even be deployed en masse and engage in
collective decision making scenarios. Types of these devices range from home appliances
such as refrigerators, light bulbs, stereos to urban infrastructures such as automated street-
lights, recycling sensors etc or even military applications e.g., UAVs, drones. As of 2016,
there are approximately 3,4 billion people who are connected to the internet, while the
number of IoT devices the same year is estimated to be 6,4 billion. The latter is estimated
at least to triple (or quadriple) by 20202. Some of the reasons for this massive boost in
the deployment of IoT devices are the advances in the microchip production amazingly
consistent with (Gordon) Moore’s law3 that leads to decrease in costs. Hence the design
of such an immense networks of IoT devices, possibly communicating with one another,
and making collective decisions on what type of actions to take is an essential scientific
endeavor.
One implication of the increase in the availability of cheap IoT devices is the massive
increase in the size of available data. The term Big Data is used to refer to the type of
data sets that are so large or complex that traditional data processing application software
is inadequate to deal with4. Imagine an agricultural application where tens of thousands
of sensors are deployed on a field to measure certain characteristics of the soil. One typical
problem in these applications occur when sensors go out of calibration. It is therefore
imperative for the user to decide which sensor is facing such a problem and clean the raw
data by removing the input from this particular sensor. However with the advances in AI,
Machine Learning and connectivity capabilities, it is now possible to let the devices do the
job. The sensors can find out which “fellow” sensor in the network is not working well,
and then decide “collectively” to shut down this sensor in order to produce a somewhat
clean data. The devices can even aggregate their own data based on location, day, season
etc and produce already processed data so as to decrease the workload of the researcher
doing his PhD in agricultural sciences.
2See http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users and http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/
id/3165317.
3(Gordon) Moore’s law is the observation that the number of transistors in a dense integrated circuit
doubles approximately every two years. The original paper in 1965 can be also be found at Moore (1998).
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data.
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In parallel to the development in IoT devices and Big Data, there is an increase in
the automation in production, and a shift from human employment to robotics in many
traditional occupations. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) show negative effects of robots
on employment and wages depending on the exposure to robotics in different zones. Frey
and Osborne (2017) study the probability of computerisation for 702 detailed occupations.
Some jobs are already being taken by robots and AI, and the job security in different
occupations depend on how exposed the jobs are to automation. The issue is actually so
critical that AliBaba founder and chairman Jack Ma warns of “decades of pain” referring
to job disruptions that would be created by automation and the internet and asks for
educational reform (Solon, 2017).
The analysis of all the aforementioned technological advancements from socio-economic,
legal, and ethical perspectives falls within the scope of economic design. The design of co-
ordination and communication between IoT devices, and the design of hierarchical frame-
works for interaction between robots5, (also between humans and robots) are all of possible
research questions for our field. Economic design can address these problems not only from
a human-agent perspective but also from a collective AI perspective, by introducing new
delegation methods and layered aggregation procedures so as to efficiently deal with the
computational complexity issues that come along with the Big Data. In the latter, a com-
bination of tools from clustering algorithms can be enhanced by axioms from economic
design literature on a scenario basis. With its strong theoretical foundation, economic
design has a lot to offer to the society of future via revisiting its postulates, axioms, and
theorems to analyze, design, implement, and improve systems for machines, and thereby
for humans, perhaps starting from Asimov’s famous three laws of robotics6.
1.2 Untraditional markets: DLT, and (Digital) Platform Economies
Markets are typically physical places where exchanges occur and trust is the most crucial
aspect for a market and its participants to thrive. Traditionally banks serve a centralized
medium for trust and binds the lender and the borrower with contracts. Distributed Ledger
Technologies (DLT) changes the very structure of this centralization. As the name suggests,
instead of a central ledger, such as a bank, in DLT systems, every transaction is written
in decentralized ledgers that cannot be altered without predefined consensus mechanisms.
Among the DLTs, Blockchain and Ethereum are the most well-known examples. The
latter especially has a lot of application with practical solutions for democratic decision
making procedures, participatory democracy and even possible direct democracy. There
are already existing financial applications based on Ether, the cryptocurrency based on
5For some interesting applications of communication and coordination between drones while making
installations such as bridges, see Augugliaro et al. (2013, 2014).
6Isaac Asimov, a scholar in chemistry by profession, was one of the first to propose robotics ethics in
his famous science-fiction story series I, Robot (1950). For an interesting read on the new field “machine
ethics” see Anderson and Anderson (2011).
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Ethereum, where people already build their own investment funds, and collectively decide
(without delegating that decision power to the bankers) which start-ups they would like to
support financially and invest in.
A relatively recent concept, (digital) platforms, is another important subject of interest
for economic design. Platforms are essentially markets where different types of agents
meet and conduct transactions. However platforms themselves are also products. To
illustrate platforms, consider two simple -and rather nostalgic- examples of the concept
that were actually not digital: VHS and Betamax video formats. Under these formats,
movie producers and consumers were matched. The choice of platform for all agents in this
multi-sided network, e.g., movie producers, consumers, movie rental shops etc., has always
been an interesting game. Agents, with a sunk cost perhaps, could leave the network and go
for the other platform (just like it did happen at the end of the Videotape format war and
resulted in the end of Betamax). Today we have the so-called digital platforms. We have
Uber, a digital platform where drivers meet passengers. We use Netflix, or Hulu (or other
platforms) to watch our favorite shows and meet content producers. Even larger platforms
where consumers and software developers meet are iOS AppStore and Google Play. Both of
these digital platforms are massive and thick markets with multiple safe payment systems.
The simplicity of smoothly buying-downloading-installing apps via these digital platforms
is incomparable to that of buying software on a real store and installing them via CDs.
Finally, without any real physical congestion like a store on a weekend would have, there
is effectively little issue of congestion.
DLT systems, digital platforms, and cryptocurrencies potentially exhibit all the fea-
tures that Roth (2015) thinks are essential for a design to work successfully. Eventually
economic design will be more and more about platform design and other the design of
digital technologies, platforms, and markets, with digital features they exhibit. Therefore
the future of economic design lies in the ambition to be the “scientific platform” under
which the designers and the implementers of digital platforms are matched.
2 Conclusion
As a final concluding thought, let us take a moment and ask ourselves: “why do we
actually not use direct democracy?”. One of the most accepted argument against direct
Greek style democracy is that it is practically not possible to ask every individual their
opinion on all issues in a society. However, given the possibilities with Ethereum and other
digital platforms, and the advances in Machine Learning and AI, it is only a matter of time
before every individual is able to choose their own AI representative and delegate collective
decisions on every issue in their society to their personal AI representative, should he or she
wish so. Perhaps in a few decades, parliamentary systems will completely disappear and be
taken over by these machine delegation systems, -a truly digital democratic platform where
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representatives are never fraud and strictly represent individuals’ perspectives. Direct
democracies under AI-representation might be much more desirable also because it can, in
principle, protect democracies from populism that often threaten universal values, human
rights, minorities. It is possible to offer a rich and diverse set of AI softwares for representing
all colors of the political spectrum, on the condition that it does not violate universally
agreed principles and does not conflict with, or challenge other pre-agreed values, such as
constitutions. Such changes should not be taken as science fiction. It is already happening
in hedge-fund investments where AI, Big Data and Machine Learning meet, and investors
are clearly better of delegating those financial decisions to machines7 rather than humans.
To sum up, the frontier of research on smart and autonomous systems has been mainly
pushed by computer scientists. However, there is an urgent need in addressing the recent
technological advances from a social sciences perspective, by using economic design and
collaborating with psychologists, philosophers and of course computer scientists. Imple-
mentation of most technologies require an ethical foundation. In case these technologies
are endowed with AI and learning capacity, these ethical, social considerations must be
encoded in the intelligence of these machines. Nationwide smart electricity grid implemen-
tations, for instance, require prioritization of services and certain locations, e.g., hospitals,
water systems, and public buildings. What are social, ethical, political consequences of dif-
ferent smart implementations? How can we build smart but also social devices, networks?
How can we ensure innovation goes hand in hand with social inclusion? How can we use
(digital) platforms to that end? These priorities should not depend only on concepts such
as cost-efficiency but also on other values, such as fairness, neutrality, consistency etc, -the
very axioms that economic design deals with.
Times are a changing, and the future has many possibilities for the mankind, some of
which may be dreadful. Economic design has the potential to incorporate human values in
the design of every prospect that may be created by the aforementioned disruptive tech-
nologies. A well designed prospect is always better than one unexpected and unforeseen,
hence, the sooner the better that economic design starts to invest in the “economic design
of things”.
7AI and Machine Learning based hedge funds have been outperforming quants and other traditional
hedge funds in a persistent way since 2010 (Eurekahedge, 2017)
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